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FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND THE “WAR
FOR CASH”
FEDERICO LUPO-PASINI*
I
INTRODUCTION
When digital payments took the fight for financial inclusion to a new level,
cash was seen by many as its most prominent victim—a relic of a not so distant
past to be sacrificed on the altar of financial innovation and economic efficiency.1
The great tech saviors of financial inclusion, products like M-Pesa in Africa,
AliPay in China, or PayTM in India, all try to create a digital ecosystem with a
main goal of bypassing the constraints of the cash economy.2 Their ultimate
objective is to build a totally new financial infrastructure that connects users and
merchants while circumventing the limits of the traditional banking and currency
systems. Not surprisingly, the big players of the inclusion world—donors like the
Gates Foundation or the World Bank—and private investors alike have
channeled their efforts into incentivizing the adoption of digital payment
solutions, which soon became the big frontier of the economic development
agenda.3
Roughly at the same time, governments in the United States, Europe, and
Asia started a parallel battle to slowly reduce the role of cash in the economy—
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1. In this Article, cash is the informal way to describe central bank-issued fiat currency in the form
of coins and banknotes. Throughout the essay, I will refer to cash, banknotes, and currency to describe
the very same concept. Yet, while cash comprises both central banks issued coins and banknotes, most
of the problems surrounding the disappearance of cash are related to banknotes.
2. See, e.g., MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., DIGITAL FINANCE FOR ALL: POWERING INCLUSIVE
GROWTH IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 7 (2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/featured
%20insights/Employment%20and%20Growth/How%20digital%20finance%20could%20boost%20gro
wth%20in%20emerging%20economies/MGI-Digital-Finance-For-All-Executive-summary-September2016.ashx [https://perma.cc/2R6C-U3VG] (discussing M-Pesa’s work to build digital economies in
Kenya); see also BENJAMIN D. MAZZOTTA ET AL., THE INST. FOR BUS. IN GLOB. CONTEXT, THE COST
OF CASH IN INDIA 77 (2014), https://sites.tufts.edu/digitalplanet/files/2020/06/Cost-of-Cash-India.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8VMP-4N2B] (discussing PayTM’s work to offer digital wallets to customers); see
generally VISA, ACCELERATING THE GROWTH OF DIGITAL PAYMENTS IN INDIA: A FIVE-YEAR
OUTLOOK (2016), available at https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/read/56210871/accelerating-thegrowth-of-digital-payments-in-india-a-f-ive-year-outlook [https://perma.cc/5VKB-TC5Z] (discussing the
growth of digital finance in India).
3. See generally WORLD BANK, DIGITAL DIVIDENDS: WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2016
(2016), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/23347/9781464806711.pdf [https://
perma.cc/J26Q-BRZW].
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what some commentators dubbed as the “war on cash.”4 Evidence shows that
banknotes are the main vehicle for laundering and storing illegal money.5
Because of the inherent anonymity of cash transactions, and the impossibility to
trace them across the payment system, cash is used to finance all sorts of illegal
activities.6 For the same reason, it is also a major vehicle for tax evasion. In his
influential book, The Curse of Cash, Harvard economist Kenneth Rogoff argued
that suppressing cash would also provide fundamental benefits to the conduct of
monetary policy, thus giving a new tool to central banks.7 The war on cash
included the deployment of certain new monetary policies, such as the abolition
of high-denomination banknotes, limits on the maximum value of cash payments,
and more stringent reporting requirements on banks for cash deposits above a
certain value.8
Despite their efforts, the level of cash circulating in Western economies has
not reduced in aggregate, primarily due to the desire of users to keep it as a safe
asset.9 This is a phenomenon particularly relevant during the COVID-19
pandemic, where cash withdrawals increased as a precaution against the fear of a
possible malfunctioning of the payment system or an economic collapse: what the
Princeton sociologist of money Frederick Wherry calls “comfort-food
hoarding.”10
What we see, instead, is a very quick decline in cash payment transactions, in
favor of digital payments. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the volume of
cash payments has reduced from 60% in 2008 to 28% in 2018 and is projected to
decline to 9% in 2028.11 In the United States, there is also a visible decline in the

4. Lawrence H. White, The Curse of the War on Cash, 38 CATO J. 477, 477 (2018) (explaining the
meaning and origin of the phrase “war on cash”).
5. See, e.g., EUROPOL, WHY IS CASH STILL KING? A STRATEGIC REPORT ON THE USE OF CASH
BY CRIMINAL GROUPS AS A FACILITATORY FOR MONEY LAUNDERING (2015), https://www.europol.
europa.eu/printpdf/publications-documents/why-cash-still-king-strategic-report-use-of-cash-criminalgroups-facilitator-for-money-laundering [https://perma.cc/4KBU-LW4D].
6. See generally Peter Sands, Making it Harder for the Bad Guys: The Case for Eliminating High
Denomination Notes (Harv. Kennedy Sch. Mossavar-Rahmani Ctr. for Bus. & Gov’t, Working Paper No.
52, 2016) (discussing the use of high denomination notes in crime).
7. See generally KENNETH ROGOFF, THE CURSE OF CASH: HOW LARGE-DENOMINATION BILLS
AID CRIME AND TAX EVASION AND CONSTRAIN MONETARY POLICY (2016).
8. White, supra note 4, at 479–81.
9. See, e.g., MORTEN BECH ET AL., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENT, PAYMENTS ARE A-CHANGIN’
BUT CASH STILL RULES 67–80 (2018), https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1803g.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8E9V-CJVY] (explaining that the total amount of certain currency denominations in circulation,
including the U.S. Dollar, has increased, likely as a result of increased demand from abroad as a
mechanism of saving.).
10. Brendan Greeley, The Comfort of Cash in Time of Coronavirus, FIN. TIMES (July 16, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/b0182ea4-afc2-4d5d-a8cf-fc7407fa8a18 [https://perma.cc/7X4H-HA9K].
11. UK FIN., UK CASH AND CASH MACHINES SUMMARY 2019, at 3 (2019), https://
www.ukfinance.org.uk/sites/default/files/uploads/pdf/UK%20Cash%20and%20Cash%20Machines%20
2019%20SUMMARY.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KJ3-6UD7].

02_LUPO-PASINI_THE WAR FOR CASH (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1 2021]

FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND THE “WAR FOR CASH”

2/28/2021 12:34 PM

19

use of cash payments, albeit not as steep as the United Kingdom’s.12 Together
with the decline in transactions, we are also witnessing a dismantling of the cash
distribution and management network, due to the progressive disappearance of
ATMs and bank branches.13 The slow disappearance of cash as a retail payment
solution was not only the result of a regulatory agenda to suppress cash. It had
mostly to do with changing consumer habits in favor of more efficient digital
payments.14 This is because cash, indeed, is not efficient. It comes with all sorts of
problems, from security risks, withdrawal and distribution costs, and a shrinking
infrastructure that reduces the incentive for users to prefer it over the burgeoning
mobile and card payment system.
Yet, as I will demonstrate in this Article, the decline of cash transactions and
the slow dismantling of the cash infrastructure is creating a very serious problem
for the poorest and more marginalized parts of society—those who do not have
access to the banking and digital payment system, and who rely on cash to pay
for their necessities. Despite its inefficiencies, cash remains a fundamental, albeit
neglected, tool in the war for financial inclusion. Parliamentary inquests, central
bank reports, and civil society organizations have recently voiced their fear about
the impact that a pure cashless economy would have on the most vulnerable parts
of our society.15 This is so much so that we are now witnessing a return of the
regulatory tide in favor of cash: a war for cash that strives to keep it alive amidst
the social and economic pressure of digital payments.
The remainder of this Article will be divided in three parts. In Part II, I
explain why the disappearance of cash has a detrimental impact on financial
inclusion. Parts III and IV introduce and discuss some of the new regulatory
trends in favor of cash—notably, the question of cash discriminations, and the
revamp of the structural regulation on cash distribution. While the goal of this
Article is to make a general theoretical contribution to the understanding of the
role of cash in Western economies, the analysis will be largely based on the

12. See generally DAVID PERKINS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45716, LONG LIVE CASH: THE
POTENTIAL DECLINE OF CASH USAGE AND RELATED IMPLICATIONS 23 (2019) (describing the decline
in cash payments in the U.S.).
13. Patrick Collinson, Hundreds of Cash Machines Close as UK Turns to Contactless Payments,
GUARDIAN (June 29, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/money/2018/jun/29/hundreds-of-cashmachines-close-as-uk-turns-to-contactless-payments [https://perma.cc/3QS2-MNAA]; Josh Robbins,
1,250 Free ATMs Started Charging Fees in Just One Month, WHICH? (May 1, 2019), https://www.which.
co.uk/news/2019/05/exclusive-1250-free-atms-started-charging-fees-in-just-one-month/ [https://perma.cc/
C4AH-97UQ].
14. See ACCESS TO CASH REV., FINAL REPORT 12 (2019), https://www.accesstocash.org.uk/
media/1087/final-report-final-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/XZ8T-67G8] (explaining use of debit cards and
contactless payments are increasing, while use of cash is decreasing).
15. See id. at 24 (reporting that decreasing accessibility to cash would negatively impact those who
rely on it); see also SELECT COMM. ON FIN. EXCLUSION, TACKLING FINANCIAL EXCLUSION: A
COUNTRY THAT WORKS FOR EVERYONE?, 2016-17, HL 132, at 9 (UK) (describing the negative effects
of a cashless society on financial inclusion); PERKINS, supra note 12, at 23 (describing the risk that a
cashless society poses to economically vulnerable groups); URSULA DALINGHAUS, CASH MATTERS,
VIRTUALLY IRREPLACEABLE: CASH AS PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE 54 (2019) (describing public fears of
the impacts of a cashless society on stability).
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United Kingdom’s experience, with some occasional references to the United
States’. While the complexity of the current evolving monetary system would
probably need to extend the analysis on cash to the issue of Central Bank Digital
Currencies, I will leave this to the myriad of existing publications on the topic.16
II
MONETARY EXCLUSION AND CASH
The debate on financial inclusion has typically categorized the problem of
access to financial services into two distinct phenomena. On the one hand, there
is a problem of access to credit and savings, which prevents or makes it more
difficult for certain categories of individuals and firms to access the formal
banking and pension system.17 On the other hand, financial exclusion can be seen
also as a problem of access to payments. In the latter case, the issue lies in the
inability of individuals and firms to extinguish debts by transferring monetary
value through one of the various payment instruments, such as bank transfers,
checks, e-money payments, or banknotes, to name just a few.18 Both these issues
can be conceptualized as market failures. Both private payment firms and credit
institutions are unable or unwilling to provide to certain parts of the population
commercial services that are perceived as social goods.
The disappearance of cash lies perhaps at the intersection between these two
areas. I prefer to categorize this as a problem of monetary exclusion.19 While
coins and banknotes are commonly understood as payment instruments, fiat
currency—the technical name for central bank-issued coins and banknotes—is

16. See generally BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENT, BIS ANNUAL ECONOMIC REPORT 2020, § III
(2020), https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2020e.pdf [https://perma.cc/U86L-U8AN] (discussing central
bank digital currencies); TOBIAS ADRIAN & TOMMASO MANCINI-GRIFFOLI, FINTECH NOTES: THE
RISE OF DIGITAL MONEY (2019), https://www.smefinanceforum.org/sites/default/files/FTNEA
2019001.pdf [https://perma.cc/YU58-RUCW].
17. See, e.g., Abbye Atkinson, Rethinking Credit as A Social Provision, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1093, 1093,
1110–11 (2019) (explaining that, although many commentators characterize access to credit as a social
good, reliance on credit may negatively impact low-income populations because of high interest rates);
see, e.g., Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending? 87 MINN. L. REV. 1, 11
(2002) (explaining that most payday loan customers lack access to traditional credit); Angela Littwin,
Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit-Card Use and Preference Among Low-Income Consumers, 86 TEX. L.
REV. 451, 458 (2008) (describing the perils of lack of access to credit to low-income families); Creola
Johnson, The Magic of Group Identity: How Predatory Lenders Use Minorities to Target Communities of
Color, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 165, 187 (2010) (describing the lack of access to credit in
minority communities); LISA SERVON, THE UNBANKING OF AMERICA: HOW THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS
SURVIVES 81 (2017) (describing the payday loan systems that many people without access to traditional
credit are forced to use); Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1283, 1341 (2014) (describing access to credit as a “public need”).
18. See COMM. ON PAYMENTS & MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS &
WORLD BANK GRP., PAYMENTS ASPECTS OF FINANCIAL INCLUSION 5–6 (2016), https://www.bis.org/
cpmi/publ/d144.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y99E-2P68] [Hereinafter PAYMENTS ASPECTS OF FINANCIAL
INCLUSION] (describing the need for access to payment methods).
19. See generally Federico Lupo-Pasini, Is it a Wonderful Life? Cashless Societies and Monetary
Exclusion, 40 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 155 (forthcoming 2021).

02_LUPO-PASINI_THE WAR FOR CASH (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1 2021]

FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND THE “WAR FOR CASH”

2/28/2021 12:34 PM

21

also one of the main forms of money in modern economies.20 Indeed, currency is
an IOU issued by central banks to the rest of the economy. Together with bank
deposits and central bank reserves, currency makes up the bulk of the money in
our economy. Unlike central bank reserves, which can be accessed only by banks,
and bank deposits, which are essentially a service provided by commercial banks
for profit, currency is available to everyone. It is the closest thing to a public good
we have in our economy.21 The disappearance of cash is, therefore, much more
than a simple market failure of the payment system. On the contrary, it
underlines the broader inability of individuals to access the most basic form of
public money, and the parallel retrenchment of the state in the provision of a
public good—a place that has been occupied by banks, the gatekeepers to the
modern payment world.
A. Cash as a Public Good
Since the advent of modern banking in the late nineteenth century, unbanked
individuals or firms willing to make or receive a payment had essentially two
means of doing so. On the one hand, they could access bank-issued negotiable
instruments, such as checks. While checks are now disappearing, they were for a
long time a very important payment tool, whose negotiability allowed them to be
traded by everyone without having to open a bank account. On the other hand,
they could use the other negotiable instrument: banknotes. Banknotes, for a
certain time, were also issued by private banks. However, the inefficiency of the
private banknote system and the parallel rise in the importance of central banks
led to central banks’ monopoly in the issue of currency.22 Thus, fiat money
became a public service provided by the state.
Cash has three fundamental legal properties that make it the most inclusive
payment method. First, banknotes are negotiable instruments which allow an
immediate transfer of value once the physical possession of the note is obtained
by the payee. The legal attribute of negotiability, and that of transferability
associated with it, while quite technical from a legal viewpoint, are what make
banknotes and coins so freely tradable and accessible to anyone. As Simon
Gleeson clearly puts it, negotiability “gives the transferee a claim which is an
independent free-standing right not dependent on the performance of the

20. See Micheal McLeay, Amar Radia & Ryland Thomas, Money Creation in the Modern Economy,
54 BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 4, 8 (2014) (defining “fiat” currency as “money that is not convertible to any
other asset”).
21. See DALINGHAUS, supra note 15 (describing cash as a public good).
22. See, e.g., Gary Gorton, Pricing Free Bank Notes, 44 J. MONETARY ECON. 33 (1999) (describing
private banks’ historic ability to issue banknotes); LAWRENCE H. WHITE, FREE BANKING IN BRITAIN:
THEORY, EXPERIENCE, AND DEBATE 35–38 (2d ed. 1995) (describing the history of private banks issuing
banknotes in the United Kingdom); see generally GARY GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL
CRISES: WHY WE DON’T SEE THEM COMING (2012); Benjamin Geva, Bank Money: The Rise, Fall, and
Metamorphosis of the ‘Transferrable Deposit’, in MONEY IN THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION:
MIDDLE AGES TO BRETTON WOODS (David Fox & Wolfgang Ernst eds., 2015) (explaining central
banks’ rise in importance as the issuers of banknotes).
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contract in respect of which the payment obligation was owed in the first place.”23
This is because a negotiable instrument is able to embody a legal claim in a
commercial receivable: in the case of currency, a claim against the central bank.24
Generally speaking, when currency is offered for payment, the payee can rely
on the presumption that the payer is the legitimate owner of those chattels, thus
avoiding the risk that the good faith payee might be required to return them.25
This is because the rule of commercial law of nemo dat quod non habet26 has never
been applied to cash whenever the transferee got possession of the instrument in
good faith, an innovation famously advanced in Miller v. Race.27 This specific
quality, which makes the circulation of banknotes much faster, was succinctly
expressed in a well-known obiter dictum by Lord Haldane LC:
In most cases money cannot be followed. When sovereigns or bank notes are paid over
as currency, so far as the payer is concerned, they cease ipso facto to be the subject of
specific title, as chattels. If a sovereign or bank note be offered in payment, it is, under
ordinary circumstances, no part of the duty of the person receiving it to inquire into
title. The reason for this is that chattels of such kind form part of what the law recognises
as currency and treats as passing from hand to hand in point, not merely of possession,
but of property.28

Yet, the specific possessory attributes of currency make cash a formidable
payment tool as they disentangle cash holders from the complex regulatory
requirements for access to banking. In other words, although cash ultimately
presumes the presence of the banking and private payment system underneath it
to distribute it across the territory, not all users of cash need to have a direct
relationship with a bank through a bank account to intermediate it. This is what
makes cash accessible to anyone.
Second, cash is an immediate and final means of payment which does not
expose the payee to the risk of default of the payer, thus guaranteeing an
immediate and final transfer of value in extinguishment of a debt. Banknotes do
not entail any counterparty risk: holders of banknotes do not need to worry about
the solvency of the issuer—a critical aspect in the era of private banknotes which
ultimately led to their demise—as they are backed by the state. Indeed, the
credibility of cash does not depend on the individual’s own creditworthiness or
social status, but only on the trust in the entity that issued it: the central bank.
This does not apply, for instance, to the other negotiable instrument, the check,
which always exposes the payee to the risk of the insolvency of the account
holder. This aspect is also critical for the sustainability of a monetary system, as
rumors about the insolvency of the money issuer would reduce the appeal of this
23. SIMON GLEESON, THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF MONEY 107 (2019).
24. Id. at 108.
25. Id. at 127–28.
26. This maxim provides that no one, in general, can sell personal property and convey a valid title
to it unless he is the owner or lawfully represents the owner. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544,
550 (1872).
27. See Miller v. Race (1758) 97 Eng. Rep. 398; 1 Burr 452 (Gr. Brit.); CHARLES PROCTOR, MANN
ON THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 43 (7th ed. 2012).
28. Sinclair v. Brougham [1914] AC 398 (HL) 418 (appeal taken from Eng.).
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medium of exchange among users, thus lowering the value of the money
transferred.29
Third, as I will explain below, cash has the property of anonymity, which
insulates it from the various identity requirements applicable to other methods.
B. Banks as Gatekeepers and Monetary Exclusion
Cash was for a long time the main retail payment instrument, used by
everyone. However, over time, the availability of bank deposits became so
widespread that private banks became the main suppliers of retail payment
services, alongside their core business of taking deposits and providing credit. As
Benjamin Geva said, banks became “paymasters.”30 The rise of the bank-deposit
account as the key point of access to the payment system is central to the analysis
of the disappearance of cash.
The importance of the deposit account—sometimes referred to as the
transaction account—rose slowly and steadily, so much so that the deposit
account is now the key to every payment service. It is a product without which no
other mainstream payment method except cash is accessible. Initially, the benefit
of the deposit account could only be seen for larger non-retail payments, as
banked individuals and firms had to visit a branch to benefit from the speed and
network effects of the bank-led payment network. The advent of credit and debit
cards, which are operated by private firms but nonetheless linked to bank
accounts, made the bank-based payment system even more convenient for retail
payments. Finally, when banks started to set up their digital payment
infrastructures through websites or phone apps, making a payment became even
simpler as the need to visit a bank branch was totally removed.
Crucially, the importance of the deposit account extends also to the various
digital payment mechanisms, like ApplePay, Venmo, or PayPal. The digital
aspect of payment is probably the most innovative phenomenon in retail finance
in the last few years as new incumbents managed to disrupt the long-standing
bank monopoly on retail payments and offer faster and cheaper payments to
consumers.31 Yet, with the exception of cryptocurrencies, which are used in a very
tiny fraction of retail payments, e-money products and all electronic payment
facilities still require users to have a bank account.32 Indeed, in order to open a
29. In other words, because payees would not trust that the entity issuing the money would back its
promise to redeem it, the actual value of the money traded would be lower than its face value. The
problem of trust applies only partially to bank deposits, as deposit insurance schemes guarantee public
backing against the bank’s default. However, it can apply sometimes to non-bank e-money and epayments, which are not always subject to the same public backstop of bank deposits.
30. BENJAMIN GEVA, BANK COLLECTIONS AND PAYMENT TRANSACTIONS: A COMPARATIVE
LEGAL ANALYSIS (2001).
31. See Adam J. Levitin, Pandora’s Digital Box: The Promise and Perils of Digital Wallets, 166 U.
PA. L. REV. 305, 307 (2008) (“Digital wallets are poised to transform the world of consumer payments
and commerce.”).
32. See, e.g., Izabella Kaminska, The Finance Franchise and FinTech (Part 2), FIN. TIMES (Aug. 18,
2017), https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2017/08/18/2192493/the-finance-franchise-and-fintech-part-2/ [https://
perma.cc/E5Y5-VAZ5]; Izabella Kaminska, Why There is No Such Thing as A Trustless Financial System,
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private e-money account it is necessary to buy e-money, which can only be done
by exchanging deposit money for e-money.
On top of that, while digital payments generally provide large benefits for the
financial system, as they allow faster and cheaper access to payments, thus
bypassing some of the constraints of the standard bank retail payments and cash,
they do come with their own challenges. As clearly shown by the U.K. Access to
Cash Review, and by other new studies, digital payments are inaccessible for a
minority of the population.33 This is due to a number of reasons ranging from
digital illiteracy, lack of access to broadband and internet, and idiosyncrasies in
operating digital devices. Thus, as cash disappears due to changing consumer
habits that favor digital payments, e-money is typically not a viable alternative
for the unbanked as it still depends on access to a deposit account and
technological accessibility.
So, what’s left in terms of payments for the unbanked? Very little,
unfortunately. In developing countries, the agent banking system—a new
distribution channel that allows financial institutions and other commercial
actors to offer financial services outside traditional bank premises—does allow
cash to be converted into e-money products, although even agent banking
requires identity verifications.34 Agent banking, however, is basically absent in
Western countries. A few card providers do allow cash to be converted into
digital money. But those cards do not have an extensive network to tap into, thus
reducing their economic effect for the unbanked. On top of that, neither of these
solutions solve the underlying problem of exclusion. If cash disappears, no
conversion of official money into e-money will be possible. The unbanked will be
simply locked out of the same payment systems that are causing the
disappearance of cash.
As the bank deposit is central to our retail payment system, and as viable
payment alternatives like e-money largely depend on access to a bank deposit
account, banks have become the gatekeepers to the payment world. This position
of quasi-monopolism is challenged only by cash and some fringe
cryptocurrencies. The importance of the deposit account is nothing new. In a
seminal research paper on the payment aspects of financial inclusion, the Bank
for International Settlements warned that access to a transaction account is a key
element in the fight for financial inclusion.35 Yet, while the importance of deposit

FIN. TIMES (July 31, 2017), https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2017/07/31/2192105/why-there-is-no-such-thing-asa-trustless-financial-system/ [https://perma.cc/manage/create?folder=14471]; Robert C. Hockett & Saule
T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143, 1202 (2017) (describing
cryptocurrencies’ “one-to-one” model of finance); Morgan Ricks, Money as Infrastructure, 3 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 757, 833–36 (2018).
33. ACCESS TO CASH REV., supra note 14, at 24.
34. See Gautam Ivatury, Timothy Lyman & Stefan Staschen, Use of Agents in Branchless Banking
for the Poor: Rewards, Risks, and Regulation, CGAP FOCUS NOTE, no. 38, 2006 (defining “branchless
banking” or “agent banking”).
35. PAYMENTS ASPECTS OF FINANCIAL INCLUSION, supra note 18, at 5 (describing transaction
accounts as “the cornerstone for providing electronic payment services”).
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accounts increases, individuals are still experiencing the same problems in
accessing them. In the United States, profitability is still an issue, as retail account
applications for low-income individuals are sometimes refused by banks. Very
basic financial literacy is also a problem, especially for those individuals with
cognitive disabilities or little education.
Yet, by far the most important barrier to banking access is probably the
presence of regulatory requirements on identity verification. At present, financial
institutions are required to comply with anti-money laundering (AML) and
combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) regulations, which prevent them
from opening anonymous accounts to customers. In the House of Lords Financial
Exclusion Committee Report, know-your-customers regulations were identified
as one of the key issues preventing access to a bank account.36 Certain groups,
like homeless people, people with mental disabilities, undocumented immigrants,
or people fleeing their homes might find it extremely challenging to provide the
documentation required to open a bank account.37 The same problem extends
also to mainstream digital payment providers, as access to the digital payment
system, with the exception of cryptocurrencies, needs users to be vetted. This
makes it impossible for anonymous users to access the cashless payment system.
A recent Bank of England discussion paper on central bank digital currencies
admits that identity verification would still be necessary even if the Bank of
England were to issue its own digital currency, thus making anonymous payments
impossible.38 Thus, in our financial system, access requires identification.
In this light, we can see how the anonymity of cash and the fact that it does
not require any identification to use it make it the most equitable payment
instrument and a real vehicle of financial inclusion. The attributes of negotiability
and transferability inherent in banknotes separate the user’s identity from the
value of the instrument offered in discharge of debt. They do so by linking that
value to the identity—and the credit—of the issuing entity, either a private bank
or the central bank. In essence, they make currency anonymous. This third key
attribute of currency was clearly identified in a very famous judicial decision,
Moss v. Hancock,39 in which money is described as: “that which passes freely from
hand to hand throughout the community in final discharge of debts and full
payment for commodities, being accepted equally without reference to the
character or credit of the person who offers it. . . .”40
Yet, identity regulation is not simply a question of checks and risks, as a
superficial analysis of AML and CFT requirements might suggest. On the
contrary, it underpins a much deeper vision of which category of individuals a
monetary system considers worthy of protection. Depending on the design of

36. SELECT COMM. ON FIN. EXCLUSION, supra note 15, at 59–62.
37. Id. at 60.
38. BANK OF ENG., CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCY: OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES AND
DESIGN 32 (2020).
39. Moss v. Hancock [1899] 2 QB 111 (UK).
40. Id. at 116 (emphasis added).
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those rules and their scope, access could be open to anyone, including homeless
persons or undocumented migrants, as is characteristic of cash, or limited to those
who have a legal proof of identity and residence, as required by bank deposits.
This is an important consideration if central banks will indeed decide to issue
central bank digital currencies to offset the decline of cash. Without disentangling
digital currencies from identity verification, digital cash will not be a feasible
payment instrument for many unbanked individuals.41
To conclude, the availability of different payment mechanisms and a new type
of money was heralded by the economic development and financial literature as
a steppingstone for financial inclusion. However, the progressive disappearance
of cash is creating a hole in the monetary and payment system that deprives
unbanked individuals from their only means of payment. In the end, the
contemporary disappearance of cash, the difficulty in accessing bank products,
and the rise of bank-led payments creates a triple whammy that locks the most
disadvantaged parts of society out of the economy.
III
CASH DISCRIMINATIONS
The disappearance of cash, particularly visible in the United Kingdom and
other advanced cashless economies, has shown how our societies rely on this
basic and yet somehow fundamental form of money. As a result, a movement to
preserve cash started to gain traction, propelled by civil society and consumer
groups organizations. In the United Kingdom, a parliamentary inquiry, the
Access to Cash Review, was set up to look at the issues raised by the
disappearance of cash and the reasons behind it.42 A similar initiative was
implemented in the United States with Long Live Cash, a U.S. congressional
report on the decline of banknotes.43 As a result, we are now entering a new phase
in the regulation of cash, which for the first time looks at how to keep cash alive.
In this Part and the next, I will discuss two key regulatory trends: the rebooting
of legal tender legislation to address cash discriminations, and the structural
reforms on cash supply and distribution.
A. Rebooting Legal Tender
In the free market of payments, network externalities often determine the
success of one payment instrument over another. A payment system finds one of
its core strength in the scope of the network that users can rely on to discharge

41. See generally EUR. CENT. BANK, EXPLORING ANONYMITY IN CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL
CURRENCIES (2019) (describing a proof of concept for maintaining anonymity in digital currency issued
by central banks).
42. ACCESS TO CASH REV., supra note 14, at 4.
43. See PERKINS, supra note 12, at 1 (describing the decline in cash usage in the U.S.).
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their debts.44 The more users choose a specific form of payment to settle their
debts, the higher the value of that payment network. The same also applies to
money. Since money is a claim, the more people trust that money will keep its
value, the higher the chance that payees will accept it in discharge of debts and
use it themselves to settle their debts. In the case of currency, the success of this
medium of exchange is based on trust that the token or the claim will be
redeemable or transferred on to someone else without losing value. Economic
history shows that it is ultimately the market that decides whether a specific form
of money is successful or not. If this is not the case, either because users do not
trust the issuer’s pledge to keep the value of the money stable over time, or
because of other difficulties in using that type of money, the money will lose its
strength as a medium of exchange. Yet, governments have for a long time tried
to nudge users to choose a specific form of money—the state fiat currency—over
others.45 One way to do so is to prohibit payees from refusing currency when
tendered for payments by payers, and from accepting anything other than the
designated currency—the so-called legal tender.
The use of legal tender as a monetary tool is not uniform around the world.
While certain countries, like France, have kept the refusal of cash payments
punishable by an administrative fine, most legal tender legislations have lost their
original purpose, and are now nothing more than a nudge to vendors. In the
United Kingdom, the concept of legal tender only obliges the payee to accept
Bank of England notes and coins as discharge of debt when tendered for payment
by the payer. However, it does not oblige the parties to pay only with legal tender,
as they routinely do when paying with checks, bank transfers, or bank cards. Nor
does it excuse a payer from paying with a different payment method when that
was contractually agreed or when the creditor refuses it. A creditor is still free to
sue on the debt in court after he has refused a valid tender. But he will be barred
from claiming the interest accruing on the debt after the date of tender and he
will have to pay the costs of the action.46 As Gleeson points out, legal tender is
nowadays useful in English law only as a strategic litigation device that allows
debtors to claim a breach of contract.47
In the United States, legal tender legislation is similarly in favor of payees,
who have the right to refuse cash. Indeed, while the Coinage Act of 1965
stipulates that “United States coins and currency are legal tender for the all debts,
public charges, taxes, and dues”,”48 there is no federal law mandating that shops,

44. See JOHN A. WEINBERG, FED. RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND, NETWORK EXTERNALITIES
PUBLIC GOODS IN PAYMENT SYSTEMS 4 (1996) (“The value to an individual user of a network
service depends on the number of other users to whom the individual connects through the network.”).
45. See GLEESON, supra note 23, at 133–34 (describing historical government attempts to incentivize
the use of state fiat currency).
46. I thank the anonymous commentator on an earlier draft of this Article for this point.
47. GLEESON, supra note 23, at 140–41.
48. 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2018) (“United States coins and currency (including Federal reserve notes and
circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks) are legal tender for all debts, public
charges, taxes, and dues.”); 31 C.F.R. § 100.3 (2019).
AND
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individuals, and businesses must accept currency for payments.49 Thus, despite
legal tender laws making it illegal to refuse a payment in cash to settle a debt,
payees can circumvent this requirement by posting a sign limiting transactions to
those paid by card, or by making the contractual performance only after the
customer pays, as most fast food restaurants do.50
While for most of modern history legal tender was largely ignored as a legal
tool, it might make a surprising comeback as a result of the rise of cash
discriminations. Since mobile payments took hold, a few businesses have started
to refuse cash for payment, perhaps because of the risk of robberies or as a part
of the shop’s broader shift towards technology. The issue is not confined to some
trendy hipster bars, but also extends to certain gig-economy services such as
Uber, which specifically require payment through debit cards. The problem of
cash discriminations, however, was exacerbated further during the COVID-19
pandemic. A lot of news establishments reported that shops in the United
Kingdom, France, and the United States refused or openly discouraged cash due
to the fear that the exchange of cash would transmit the disease through surface
contamination.51 The problem was so widespread that the Bank for International
Settlement issued a report on the effective transmission risks attached to
banknotes.52
The disappearance of cash both before and during the COVID-19 pandemic
led to a backlash from civil society organizations, which raised awareness of the
impact that the cashless economy has on the weakest parts of the population. As
a result, we are now witnessing a new regulatory trend to reboot legal tender
legislation and to enforce it more heavily. We can see the first real signs of this
regulatory trend in the United States, which is paradoxically the most cash
friendly among Western economies. In 2019—prior to the COVID-19 pandemic’s
exacerbation of the problem—two different bills, the Cash Always Should Be
Honored Act and the Payment Choice Act of 2019, were introduced
concomitantly to address the problem of cash discrimination. If approved, those
bills would make the refusal of cash illegal and allow customers to sue any retail
establishment that does not accept cash as a mean of payment.53 Similar laws were
issued at the state level. For instance, a 1978 law from the State of Massachusetts
states: “No retail establishment offering goods and services for sale shall
discriminate against a cash buyer by requiring the use of credit by a buyer in order
49. Samuel Erlanger, A Cashless Economy: How to Protect the Low-Income, 2019 CARDOZO L.
REV. DE-NOVO 166, 170 (2019); U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, LEGAL TENDER STATUS, https://www.
treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Currency/Pages/legal-tender.aspx [https://perma.cc/96AA-LNC4].
50. Erlanger, supra note 49, at 190–91.
51. Izabella Kaminska, How Covid-19 Has Reframed the War on Cash, FIN. TIMES (June 24, 2020),
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2020/06/24/1592998802000/How-Covid-19-has-reframed-the-war-on-cash-/
[https://perma.cc/CV5J-T72B].
52. See RAPHAEL AUER, GIULIO CORNELLI & JON FROST, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENT,
COVID-19, CASH, AND THE FUTURE OF PAYMENTS 1 (2020) (describing both the real risk of COVID-19
transmission via banknotes and the public’s perception of such risk).
53. Cash Should Always be Honored (CASH) Act, H.R. 2630, 116th Cong. (2019); Payment Choice
Act of 2019, H.R. 2650, 116th Cong.
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to purchase such goods and services. All such retail establishments must accept
legal tender when offered as payment by the buyer.”54 The effect of these laws is
to forcibly keep the demand for cash up, thus artificially maintaining the network
externalities that cash needs in order to survive. The marginalized groups that
rely on cash as a mechanism of payment will therefore be included in the
economic system.
In Sweden, where cashless payments led to the quasi-disappearance of cash,
consumer and pensioners groups lobbied heavily to raise awareness on the cost
of cash discriminations.55 As a result, the Sveriges Riksbank, the national central
bank, has called upon regulators to amend the legislation on legal tender to make
cash acceptance mandatory for all shops and retail establishments selling vital
goods and services in order to protect those social groups that rely mostly on cash.
At present, in Sweden, cash acceptance is mandatory only in states of heightened
alert such as in the event of war, natural disasters, and other similar events.
Interestingly, an opinion of the Sveriges Riksbank argues that keeping cash alive
is a strategic economic interest as it would be very difficult to get the cash system
to function during emergencies if it was not already in use during normal times.56
Alternatively, in France, where legislation makes refusal to accept cash payments
an administrative violation punishable by a fine, the French Competition
Authority has decided to open a number of investigations on the widespread
violation of legal tender law.57
B. The European Court of Justice Case
The question of the role of legal tender in protecting against cash
discrimination is currently being discussed in a high-profile case at the European
Court of Justice (ECJ), the highest court in European Union law. The case arose
from a complaint initially litigated in German courts by a cash activist, Johannes
Dietrich, against the German public broadcaster, which does not allow
subscribers to pay their annual fee in cash. The plaintiff alleges that the inability
to pay the TV license in cash is in violation of the EU law, which sets an
unconditional and unrestricted obligation to accept euro banknotes as a means
for the settlement of monetary debts.58 While in the Eurozone there is a common
54. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 255D § 10A (1978).
55. Maddy Savage, The Swedes Rebelling Against a Cashless Society, BBC NEWS (Apr. 6, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-43645676 [https://perma.cc/VV2H-DTB6].
56. SVERIGES RIKSBANK, SEPARATE STATEMENT OF OPINION BY CHRISTINA WEJSHAMMAR 4,
https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/press-and-published/notices-and-press-releases/notices/2019/proposednew-sveriges-riksbank-act/ [https://perma.cc/HE7Y-PGED] (proposing an earlier effective date for
Riksbank’s legislative proposal regarding cash acceptance on the grounds that implementing a cash
acceptance mandate only once a crisis has occurred would be inefficient).
57. Guillaume Lepect, France: Controversy over Stores Refusing Cash Steps up, CASHESSENTIALS
(May 28, 2020), https://cashessentials.org/france-controversy-over-stores-refusing-cash-steps-up/ [https:/
/perma.cc/W2ZL-4TQZ].
58. See Joined Cases C-422/19 and C-423/19, Johannes Dietrich & Norbert Häring v. Hessischer
Rundfunk, ECLI:EU:C:2020:756 ¶19 (Sept. 29, 2020) (explaining that 2016 O.J. (C 202) 103, 2016 O.J.
(C 202) 230, and 1998 O.J. (L 139) 5 set an unconditional obligation to accept euro banknotes).
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legislation on the role of the euro as the official currency, there is no definition
of what legal tender means in practice, thus leaving member states flexibility in
drafting local payment legislation, including providing exemptions for non-cash
payments.59 The ECJ was asked by the German Federal Court to provide a
preliminary ruling under EU law on the freedom of EU member states to decide
the ambit of application of legal tender legislation. While the specific legal
questions to be clarified by the ECJ are quite technical and concern the role of
euro banknotes as a means of payment in the Eurozone, they nonetheless deal
with a very basic question: whether EU members have the right to set legislation
that limits the practical application of legal tender legislation and, in turn, the use
of euro banknotes as means of payment. 60
The importance of this judgment cannot be understated. Far from being a
dispute on an arcane provision of EU monetary law, the ECJ case has the
potential to reframe the role of fiat currency across the entire Eurozone, thus
forcing the harmonization and strengthening of legal tender legislation in all euro
countries. Moreover, it would also for the first time allow the highest court of EU
law to properly flesh out the relationship between cash discriminations and the
fundamental rights enshrined in EU legislation. According to sources, the
European Commission’s representative argued that the ability to pay in
banknotes or coins was a fundamental right of every EU citizen, which should
not be restricted unduly.61 This position echoed what was said not long before by
Yves Mersh, a member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank,
thus formally representing the ECB’s view on the topic. In a speech on the role
of euro banknotes as legal tender he said that:
Cash, as a medium of transaction in many instances, opens the way for the exercise of
many fundamental right . . . such as the right to “informational self-determination”,
freedom of action and freedom of speech . . . . The store-of-value function of cash is
directly linked to property rights. The easy accessibility to cash, especially for the
elderly, the socially vulnerable or minors, allows people to participate in society and,
for example, allows children to learn how to handle money. In particular, when socially
vulnerable people use cash, they face none of the barriers involved in applying for a
credit card or, despite all their efforts, opening a current account.62

Thus, the ECJ’s judgment has the potential to restore the role of cash in the
Eurozone by granting the most vulnerable people access to a viable payment
mechanism.

59. See, e.g., 2016 O.J. (C 202) 103; 2016 O.J. (C 202) 230; 1998 O.J. (L 139) 5 (all declining to
expressly define the term “legal tender” in reference to euro banknotes).
60. Martina Horakova, Cash, Legal Tender, and the Future of Euro Banknotes, CASHESSENTIALS
(Aug. 3, 2020), https://cashessentials.org/cash-legal-tender-and-the-future-of-euro-banknotes/ [https://
perma.cc/GV3J-VXHK].
61. See id.
62. Yves Mersch, The Role of Euro Banknotes as Legal Tender (speech given at the 4th
Bargeldsymposium of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt am Main) (Feb. 14 2018), (transcript
available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2018/html/ecb.sp180214.en.html [https://perma.cc/
Z8GD-5MWM]).
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IV
ADDRESSING STRUCTURAL REGULATIONS
Addressing the demand side of cash alone would not guarantee its survival.
Very deep structural problems in the distribution of cash also make its supply
very challenging. This is particularly evident in the United Kingdom, where the
overly complex ATM distribution network was identified as the main challenge
in the war for cash.63 Indeed, while cash can be used by anyone, it is private banks
and ATM providers—and their customers—that bear the direct costs of its
distribution, effectively subsidizing the social cost of cash for the unbanked. In a
private market, however, the functioning of the cash distribution system is
predicated on its profitability, which was until recently guaranteed by the volume
of cash withdrawals. Yet, as soon as the reduction in the total demand of cash
reached a trigger point, the entire edifice of cash distribution started to crumble.
In the United Kingdom, users can get cash from five different sources: paid
ATMs, free ATMs, stores (commonly known as “cashback”), the Post Office,
and bank branches. None of these options are free from costs for the consumers
and the providers. The ATM network is managed by private providers—in the
United Kingdom by LINK, Mastercard, and Visa—which charge banks around
twenty-five pence every time a bank customer withdraws cash in one of the many
ATMs in their networks.64 The interchange fee is what makes the cash system
profitable for the providers, but competition between providers and the need to
cut costs have put pressure on the sustainability of the system. LINK has over
time tried to subsidize ATMs in deprived areas and reduced the fees. A study
from the University of Bristol shows that the closure of ATMs affects precisely
those geographical areas where the percentage of cash-dependent users is
higher.65 However, given that ATMs have fixed and variable costs that make the
cost per transaction higher than the fee, they do not make a profit unless they are
used frequently.66
Various solutions were proposed by consumer groups and the industry to
address the rising cost of cash and disappearance of ATMs. One option was for
the Payment System Regulator (PSR) to intervene directly to set the interchange
fees in a way that would have guaranteed the geographical spread of the ATM
network and the protection of vulnerable cash users. This option was not
accepted due to the reluctance of the U.K. regulator to intervene in a private
market issue. Another was to impose a universal service obligation on banks and
63. See ACCESS TO CASH REV., supra note 14, at 114 (describing the decline in ATM withdrawals
in the United Kingdom); see also FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., GUIDANCE CONSULTATION: BRANCH AND
ATM CLOSURES AND CONVERSIONS (2020) (providing guidance to firms involved in operating ATMs).
64. Unless the consumer withdraws cash from the bank’s own ATM, in which case it is free. See The
Issue of ATMs, WHICH? (2019) (unpublished article, on file with author).
65. DANIEL TISCHER, JAMIE EVANS & SARA DAVIES, MAPPING THE AVAILABILITY OF CASH: A
CASE STUDY OF BRISTOL’S FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE 48 (2019) (describing the vulnerability of
cash-reliant communities to ATM closures or the conversion of free ATMs into fee-charging ATMs).
66. PAYMENT SYS. REGUL., CP19/5 – CALL FOR VIEWS: CONSIDERING THE INCENTIVES TO
DEPLOY FREE-TO-USE ATMS IN THE LINK NETWORK 9–10 (2019).
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payment system providers which would have them intervene by providing cash
free of charge in those areas where the costs are higher. A similar strategy was
adopted in Sweden, where a new law—the Obligation for Certain Credit
Institutions to Provide Cash Services—was enacted in early 2021.67 The law,
which requires banks to guarantee access to cash withdrawal and deposit services
for all citizens, was one of the first moves by the Swedish government to protect
the role of cash in the economy, after years in which the focus was on growth of
the digital payment system.68
With no agreement between the PSR, the banks, and the other private firms
involved, the solution was for a long-time evasive. At the core of the problem was
the absence of an overarching statutory framework on the protection of cash,
similar to that applied to other financial services. Until very recently, cash was
subject to very light touch regulation, which only covered the competition and
consumer protection aspects of the cash disbursement network.69 This meant that
there was no overarching statutory obligation on any of the various financial
authorities in the United Kingdom to look at the financial inclusion implications
of the disappearance and cost of cash.
The pressure caused by the COVID-19 crisis on the United Kingdom’s
economy somehow made the need to protect cash and speed up some of the more
daring regulatory reforms more visible. In its 2020 Budget, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer has announced that the Government will put forward legislation to
guarantee access to cash and to ensure that the United Kingdom’s cash
infrastructure is sustainable in the long-term.70 As a first move in that direction,
HM Treasury, the Bank of England, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and
the PSR have set up the Joint Access to Cash Strategy Group, which oversees the
strategy for cash in the United Kingdom.71 As a second move, in July 2020, the
FCA published a draft Guidance to firms on maintaining access to cash for
customers. According to the Guidance, when firms decide to reduce the access to
cash for their customers, either by closing an ATM or a branch, they need to
inform the regulator and evaluate the impact that the closure will have on

67. See
SVERIGES
RIKSBANK,
PAYMENTS
IN
SWEDEN
2019,
at
12,
https://www.riksbank.se/globalassets/media/rapporter/sa-betalar-svenskarna/2019/engelska/paymentsin-sweden-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/4B99-UG77]
68. See id.; see also EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK OF
26 NOVEMBER 2019 ON THE REQUIREMENT FOR CERTAIN CREDIT INSTITUTIONS AND BRANCHES TO
PROVIDE CASH SERVICES 2, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:
52019AB0041&from=EN [https://perma.cc/DG24-GPAH].
69. This covered the LINK interchange fees, which was based on an individual exemption by the
Office of Fair Trading (OFT) under the Competition Act 1998. PAYMENT SYS. REGUL., supra note 66,
at 18–19.
70. Jim Pickard & Nicholas Megaw, Rishi Sunak Acts to Preserve Access to Cash for the Vulnerable,
FIN. TIMES (March 6, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/d4590be4-5fcd-11ea-8033-fa40a0d65a98 [https://
perma.cc/EPZ9-W7PX].
71. The FCA’s And PSR’s Joint Approach To Access To Cash, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (June 16,
2020), https://www.fca.org.uk/news/statements/fca-psr-joint-approach-access-cash [https://perma.cc/
6ZRW-7496].
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customers, and vulnerable customers in particular.72 Yet, at present, it is
impossible to say whether the U.K. strategy will work, or whether more
interventions will be required. Given the complexity of the entire economic
environment in the United Kingdom as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, only
time will tell.
V
CONCLUSION: GOODBYE CASH?
Cash is still a fundamental aspect of the armory for financial inclusion.
Despite the security risks and overall management costs attached to it, cash has
properties that are simply not replicable in any other monetary instrument, from
bank deposits to e-money or even central bank digital currencies. The anonymity
of cash, while certainly posing a problem of tax evasion and security, nonetheless
guarantees the highest level of inclusion. Cash allows the most disadvantaged
parts of the population to access the monetary system and to participate in the
economic life of the society they live in. Yet, it is subject to an inevitable decline
that will soon make its costs too high to bear for banks and cash distribution
providers. At some point, a choice will have to be made about the level of
exclusion we are ready to accept in our society. For those who believe that
undocumented individuals and homeless persons have the same right to pay for
their food as anybody else, the preservation of cash is mandatory, even if it comes
at a cost. Perhaps it is time for central banks to consider their public role and be
ready to simply subsidize the cost of cash.

72. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 63, at 3.

